JUST COMPENSATION AND THE ASSASSIN'S BEQUEST:
A UTILITARIAN APPROACH
On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was killed by an
assassin's bullet. Close on the heels of the tragedy, hucksters
began their profiteering on the nation's grief. They held little
sacred, not even items directly involved in the assassination itself.
Mr. John J. King, who purchased the rifle from which the fatal
bullet was fired and the pistol used in the murder of Officer
Tippitt, declared to the Senate in 1965 that his prizes were
"the Mona Lisa" and "La Pieta" of the firearms world and
indicated his intention to make millions of dollars displaying the
weapons all over the world.1
Popular disgust at the exploitation of objects so closely
connected with President Kennedy's death challenged public
institutions to respond. In August 1973, the National Archives
purchased the equipment in the emergency room of the Dallas
hospital in which the President was pronounced dead. The
purchase was made expressly to prevent the equipment's commercial exploitation. "'No one,'" declared a spokesman for the
National Archives, "'realistically would want this material to
wind up in a private collection and be displayed.., ina tasteless

way.

In Porter v. United States,3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was faced with deciding whether the broadly shared
distaste which prompted the action of the National Archives
should find expression in law. The court's choice was framed by
the following events. Pursuant to Public Law 89-318,' which
'111 CONG. REc. 27,262 (1965).
Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 18, 1973, at 3, col. 5.
3473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'g 335 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
4Act of November 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 1185. In relevant part, the statute provides:
[I]t is hereby declared that the national interest requires that the United
States acquire all right, tide, and interest, in and to, certain items of evidence, to
be designated by the Attorney General pursuant to section 2 6f this Act, which
were considered by the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter referred to as 'items'), and requires that those items
be preserved by the United States.
Sec. 2. (a) The Attorney General is authorized to determine, from time to
time, which items should, in conformity with the declaration contained in the
first section on this Act, be acquired and preserved by the United States. Each
such determination shall be published in the Federal Register.
(b) Whenever the Attorney General determines that an item should be
acquired and preserved by the United States, all right, tide, and interest in and
to, that item shall be vested in the United States upon publication of that
determination in the Federal Register.
Sec. 3. The United States Court of Claims or the United States district court
for the judicial district wherein the claimant resides shall have jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy, to hear, determine, and render

THE ASSASSIN'S BEQUEST

authorized the United States to acquire important items of
evidence considered by the Warren Commission, the Government took title 5 to Lee Harvey Oswald's personal papers, photographs and the contents of his wallet, property which had been
owned by Oswald's widow, Maina Oswald Porter. The statute
provided that the government justly compensate those from
whom property was taken, and Mrs. Porter brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
seeking a determination of the compensation due her.
A special master was appointed by the district court to find
the market value of the items. He determined that their market
value, including their potential commercial worth, was
$17,729.37. The district court, while accepting the special
master's findings, made clear its belief that to allow Mrs. Porter
to realize such a large profit due solely to her ties with the
President's assassin would constitute a grave injustice. It therefore awarded Mrs. Porter $3,000, the sum that both parties
stipulated was the" 'market value of personal property similar in
kind'" to the property which was the subject of the suit. 6 The
court of appeals, though not unmoved by this notion of equity,
felt constrained by established principles of law to award what it
saw to be the clear and unambiguous fair market value of the
property and reversed the district court's decision and awarded
Mrs. Porter the value found by the special master, $17,729.37.7
The basis of the disagreement between the district court and the
court of appeals will become clearer in light of the theory and
goals of the law of just compensation.
I.

ELEMENTS OF JUST COMPENSATION

A.

Fair Market Value

The law governing the determination of appropriate compensation in condemnation proceedings is dominated by the
concept of fair market value." In an effort to establish workable
judgment upon any claim for just compensation for any item or interest therein
acquired by the United States pursuant to section 2 of this Act ....
' The property in question had actually been in the possession of the government
since November 22, 1963 and used in the investigation of the assassination. 473 F.2d at
1332. Thus, the precise date of the taking of the items, an important fact for valuation
purposes, was placed in issue. However, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
determined the date of the taking to be November 1, 1966, 335 F. Supp. at 500, 473 F.
2d at 1336, and our discussion will assume this to be the actual date of the taking.
6 The government's agreement with this grossly inflated estimate of the value of
items like those taken from Mrs. Porter is a most intriguing element of the case, and one
not overlooked by the Court of Appeals. 473 F.2d at 1333 n.4. See also text preceding
note 50 infra.
7473 F.2d at 1334-5, 1338.
'See 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1-12.2 (3d rev. ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as NICHoLS]. For an interesting critique of the idea of fair market value
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rules9 effectuating the command of the fifth amendment that
compensation in the wake of takings by the government be just
"both to [the] owner whose property is taken and to the public
that must pay the bill,"1 0 courts have adopted the principle that
the owner of condemned property is "entitled to be put in as
good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken"; at the same time the owner is not
to be made better off as a result of the government's action."
This goal of indemnification 2 dictates that the owner's loss
rather than the buyer's gain determine what sum justly
compensates.' 3 If there is an ascertainable price that represents
what "a purchaser willing but not obligated to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking
into consideration all uses for which [it] was suited and might in
reason be applied,"' 4 that sum, the fair market value, is generally
assumed to equal the owner's loss and is therefore
considered to
5
be determinative of proper compensation.'
B.

Distributionaland Other Equity Considerations

The appeal of the indemnification model of just compensation derives from the fact that it approximates the operation of a
free and perfectly competitive market, and in so doing, leads to
an allocation of resources within society which approaches the
ideal of economic efficiency. 16 The pursuit of economic
as a measure of just compensation, see Bigham, "FairMarket Value," "Just Compensation,"
and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1970).
9United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943).
10 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
1 Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
The evolution of the indemnification theory of just compensation is traced in
Kanner, CondemnationBlight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
765, 770-87 (1973).
'3 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943).
14 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at § 12.2[1] (footnotes omitted).
5
ld. § 12.2. See also, e.g., United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co.,
338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275
(1943).
16 Definitions of economic efficiency appear numerous. Professor Calabresi and Mr.
Melamed define efficiency to be "that allocation of resources which could not be
improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the condition of those
who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off
than before. This is often called Pareto optimality." Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienabilit: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1094
(1972). This form of the definition emphasizes the relationship between the perfectly
competitive market and the attainment of a state of Pareto optimality or economic
efficiency. Given the existence of a perfectly competitive market, if trades could be made
which could increase the level of economic welfare felt by one or more members of
society without decreasing the level of welfare felt by another member, the presumption
is that such trades would continue to be made until no more such exchanges could occur.
Professor Michelman's characterization emphasizes the utilitarian basis of the concept:
"The concept of efficiency is ...a concept of ethical maximizing, implying the goodness
of increasing some quantity to the limits of possibility .... [A]n 'efficient' process is one
which maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satisfaction, in society, and not
all satisfaction is material." Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
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efficiency as the primary goal of compensation policy is not,
however, without its ethical problems. First, it relies on the
assumption that each individual has the ability to determine for
himself which allocation of resources is best from his point of
view. 17 A second and perhaps more crucial difficulty with the
primacy of efficiency stems from the fact that the specific allocation of resources resulting from market exchange depends critically on the distribution of tradable wealth among individuals
before the exchange occurred.' 8 A given allocation may be
EthicalFoundationsof 'just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1173 (1967). For an
illuminating discussion of the concept of efficiency, its relationship to market processes,
and its ethical bases, see W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS ch.
13 (1961).
It might be wondered why takings, and the problems of just compensation which
follow in their wake, are necessary at all if the competitive market can be counted on to
guarantee economically efficient transfers. The simple answer, of course, is that the
competitive market cannot always be counted on to do so. In some cases substantial costs
of information gathering and negotiation may prevent voluntary (and thus efficient)
transfers which would have taken place in the absence of such costs. The power of
eminent domain, pursuant to which takings are instituted, represents an attempt to
ensure efficient allocation in these cases as well by forcing transfer.
This device may not always be used. to society's benefit. By setting the sale price at the
fair market value and excluding any value the owner derives from the property in excess
of that price, the courts have left open the possibility that some properties may be
undervalued by the condemnation process with the result that the condemnee experiences a net reduction in personal welfare not fully compensated by the surplus generated
by the public use of his property. This result may be likely, for instance, in cases involving
property of sentimental value to the owner, value which is peculiar to him and which is
not compensable. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946). On consumer surplus, seeA
Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959, in E. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TEN
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 11, 63-71 (2d ed. 1969).
If, however, the owner of the property derives no value from it beyond the fair
market value or, as may well be the case in Porter, the fair market price itself defines the
value of the property to the owner, condemnation proceedings may result in no
inefficiencies at all. Consider the following abstraction of the Porterfacts: Mrs. Porter (P)
owns an item for which a private buyer (B) has offered $18,000. P would accept B's offer,
but the government has condemned the property and compelled her to sell to it rather
than to B. Now if the government, in the absence of the eminent domain power, would
have paid a sum equal to or in excess of $18,000 for the property, but instead exercises
the power and purchases the property for $18,000, no inefficiency has resulted.'A
welfare increase that would have accrued to B is transferred instead to the government;
the government may enjoy a consumer surplus in the property, but the final allocation of
money and property is an efficient one. Similarly, if the government, absent the
condemnation power, would have paid only a sum less than $18,000, and the court fixes
the forced sale price at $18.000, no inefficiency results if the government is then allowed
to back out of the transaction and return the property to P. Inefficient allocations result
either when the government, which would have valued the property at less than $18,000,
is forced by the court to buy the property for $18,000 (in which case we may presume the
administrative or legislative weighing of costs and benefits which led to the decision to
condemn to be in error); or when the government is able to buy the property for less
than B would have paid for it.
17 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 113-14, discusses the implications of
relaxing this condition.
18
In purely technical terms, it can be shown that by a suitable definition of prices, an
efficient allocation of resources can be derived from any set of individual preferences and
initial income shares and, conversely, for any particular set of prices and initial income
shares, at least one efficient allocation can be made. See Arrow, The Organization of
Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 61-64 (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds.
1970).
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unsatisfactory, therefore, not because it is inefficient, but rather
because the distribution of resources which preceded the market
exchange was, in some sense, unjust. To argue, then, for a
particular solution to a compensation problem because it is
efficient is to argue implicitly either that the distribution of
income or resources at the base of the efficient allocation is just
and appropriate, or that distributional or other ethical considerations in the case at hand are outweighed by the desirability of
efficient allocation.
The recognition that circumstances may at times require
that ethical concerns take precedence over allocative efficiency
has tempered the law's commitment to fair market value as a
measuring rod for just compensation. "Fairness" and "equity"
are the core values of the constitutional requirement of just
compensation, 19 and when strict application of the fair market
value standard "would result in manifest injustice to owner or
public, courts have fashioned and applied other standards. 20 .
Thus, heeding the requirements of substantial justice, the Supreme Court has forsaken the goal of allocative efficiency in
refusing to make the government pay an enhanced price created
by the exigencies of war 2 1 or by the government's own
demand.2
This view of 'just compensation"-allocative efficiency tempered by notions of equity and substantial justice-allows us to
explain the differing results reached by the two courts in Porter.
While both courts agreed that the fair market value of the
property taken from Mrs. Porter was $17,729.37 and that allocative efficiency would be best served by awarding her that sum,
the two courts disagreed as to whether this case presented
considerations of fairness and substantial justice sufficiently
powerful to require that less than the full market price be
awarded.
The district court was disturbed by the prospect of awarding
Mrs. Porter such a large sum. Although the innocence of Mrs.
Porter herself was never at issue, the court argued that the very
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
Od. at 123 (footnotes omitted); see United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) (Government not rquired to
pay market value of a tugboat where such value had been enhanced as a result of the
government's urgent wartime needs); United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624
(1948) (owners of meat taken by government during the war could recover only the
O.P.A. ceiling price despite findings that the replacement cost of the meat exceeded its
ceiling price). See also United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950);
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
22 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333 (1949); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
69 (1943) (owner not entitled to compensation for enhanced value where value of
property has increased solely due to the Government's commitment to condemn).
2'9

19741

THE ASSASSIN'S BEQUEST

enormity of the crime should, in fairness, preclude the realiza-

tion of profit by one so close to the murderer:
The circumstances of this case require that the
elements of fair market value of the property involved
here resulting from the association of the property with
the assassination of the President must be excluded

from the measure of just compensation. The nation and
its people should not be required to pay a bounty for
items of evidence upon which the Warren Commission
based its report.2 3
Furthermore, the district court also suggested that efficiency

considerations also required denial of Mrs. Porter's claim for the
fair market value of the property. To pay the enhanced value,
the court argued,
would create in a depraved mind contemplating the
destruction of the life -of one of this nation's high
officials an additional incentive for the assassination

because the crime assuredly would result in the enrichment of the assassin's spouse or other beneficiary result24
ing from the enhanced value of his possessions.
The court of appeals, while aware that the principle that one

should not be permitted to profit by his illegal act is based on
sound policy considerations, 2 5 refused to attach the stigma of
Oswald's guilt to his widow. The court argued that
[w]ere it not for the taking, the owner, Oswald's widow,
would have been able to realize a premium for Oswald's
2 335
24 Id.
25

F. Supp. at 500.

The court dealt with five cases cited by the government in support of the
proposition that full compensation was not required in this situation. The court found
that United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) and United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369
(1943), were clearly inapposite since they established only the proposition that the
government cannot in fairness be forced to pay an element of value due solely to the
government's need for the property in question. The court was more uneasy in dealing
with three cases which stand for the notion that justice demands that one who has
committed a crime should not be permitted to profit by it. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886), and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Maag, 285 F.2d
558 (10th Cir. 1960), are cases in which the slayer of an insured was barred from
receiving benefits under the insurance policy. Kingsland v. Mayor, 110 N.Y. 569, 18 N.E.
435 (1888), concerned the condemnation of a shed which had been built in violation of a
statute; the court held that the value of the shed, although transferrable to a prospective
buyer, was not compensable. 110 N.Y. at 582, 18 N.E. at 439. See also Coady v. Thatcher,
146 App. Div. 585, 131 N.Y.S. 178 (1911).
On the proposition that the government need not compensate for the taking of
illegally derived property, see NIcHoLs, supra note 8, § 12.34. On so-called "slayer's rules"
generally, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION oF LAW 75-110 (temp. ed. 1958); Wade, Acquisition of Property by
Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936) (collecting
cases).
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personal effects simply because of their association with
the killing of the president, this, regardless of whether
this court condones, as a matter of policy, the realization
of any premium attributable to such a crime. However,
this peculiar interest in the property having vested in
Oswald's widow, the court's function upon condemnation should be limited merely to assessing the value of
the interest taken; .
C.

The Impact of the Police Power on Just Compensation

The challenge of Porterand cases like it2 7 lies in satisfactorily

reconciling the court of appeals' concern for allocative efficiency
with the district court's interest in distributional equity. Meeting
this challenge requires a theory that integrates these often
conflicting themes. The outlines of a principle of reconciliation
are suggested by the contemporaneous existence of the power of
eminent domain, which was the source of government action in
Porter, and the police power. Whereas the power of eminent
domain enables the government to compel the transfer of property from an individual to the public at a given price, the police
power permits the state to confiscate or destroy the value of
property without compensation when the public welfare, morals
16473

F.2d at 1335.
" The holding of the Court of Appeals in Porter that the fair market value of the
property taken from Mrs. Porter must include elements of value attributable to commercial demand for the items as historical curiosities places it in conflict with a holding on
similar facts in the District Court for the District of Colorado, King v. United States, 292
F. Supp. 767 (D. Colo. 1968). In March, 1965, King purchased from Mrs. Porter her
interest in the rifle used to assassinate the President and the revolver used to kill Officer
J.D. Tippitt for the sum of $10,000. In a suit to determine the amount of compensation
ue King subsequent to the condemnation of the weapons by the United States under the
Act of November 2, 1965, P.L. 89-318, 79 Stat. 1185, the district court held that where, as
here, "the property is peculiar or unique, is not an object of commerce, and has no
market value," the condemnee is not entitled to produce evidence tending to establish the
market value of the weapons as historical objects. 292 F. Supp. at 775. The King holding
seems to rely implicitly on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), although that case is not cited in the district court's
opinion. In Kimball Laundry Co., the Supreme Court stated that "when the property is of a
kind seldom exchanged, it has no 'market price,' and then recourse must be had to other
means of ascertaining value, including value to the owner as indicative of value to other
potential owners enjoying the same rights." 338 U.S. at 6. See also United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949). In place of the
market value of the weapons, the King court substituted criteria of intrinsic value, defined
as the "true, inherent and essential value of a thing, not depending on accident, place or
person but the same everywhere and to everyone," 292 F. Supp. at 776 (footnote
omitted), and value to the owner, a subjectively determined figure not including value
attributable to market demand, 292 F. Supp. at 777.
The existence of a collectors' market for items such as these, recognized by both the
district court and the court of appeals in Porter, and its ability to establish a well-defined
transferable value for these goods demonstrates the dubious applicability of the Kimball
reasoning to these facts. Furthermore, the King court's somewhat arbitrary definitions of
value are, at best, economically suspect. Still, the opinion is of interest to us here, for it is
not unreasonable to infer that the same ethical concerns which prompted the district
court's holding in Porter are at the root of the King result.
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or safety so require. 28 As will become apparent, the state can
wield this power in the public interest to discourage certain kinds
of private activities and modes of acquiring property and to
encourage others.
For the present, however, it need only be pointed out that
the existence of the police power implies that the true value of
an individual's property is affected by the real possibility that the
state may choose to destroy its value without compensation. As a
result, the expectations of citizens with respect to this potential
destruction are of relevance in determining the true value of the
property they own, a principle recognized by the Supreme
Court.
A state may of course destroy or diminish values by an
assertion of its police power without the necessity of
making compensation for the loss. While such a change
will not be presumed, the possibility or probability of
such action, so far as it affects present values, is a
proper subject for consideration in valuing
property for
29
purposes of a condemnation award.
This notion of implicit discounted value is helpful in understanding the problems raised by Porter. The rationale for the fair
market value standard of just compensation is that payment by
28

Though the term "police power" resists definition, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954), courts have generally used it to refer to noncompensable regulations or
prohibitions designed to promote public convenience or the general welfare, as well as
those in the interest of public health, safety, and morals. United States ex rel. T.V.A. v.
Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284 (1943); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405,
429 (1935). While the power "to protect the vital interests of the community" is reserved
to the individual states, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934),
it is well settled that the necessary and proper clause grants Congress power, substantially
comparable to the police power, to effectuate the powers specifically granted to the
United States. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Exercise of the police power is, of course, subject to.limitation by specific provisions
of the Constitution. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949). See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (fourteenth amendment); West Virginia State Board of Ed.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (first amendment); Indiana ex rel Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 107 (1938) (contract clause). But while the courts have successfully
delineated the scope of the police power with respect to many constitutional limitations,
coherent principles defining the respective contours of the police power and the takings
clause of the fifth amendment have proven more elusive. For comprehensive discussion
and analysis of the exercise of the police power in light of this constitutional provision,
see Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
ExpropriationLaw, 1962 S. CT. REv. 63; Michelman, supra note 16; Sax, Takings and the
Police29 Power,
YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
United 74
States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284 (1943). See
also United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973) ("These cases go far towards establishing the
general principle that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate
a condemnee for elements of value that.., it might have destroyed under the exercise of
governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain."); Reichelderfer v.
Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 323 (1932); NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 12.322.
In Powelson the Court made clear that the coexistence of the eminent domain and
police powers in a given case does not of itself relieve the state of the duty to pay the
possibly discounted value of the condemned property after assertion of the power of
eminent domain. 319 U.S. at 284.
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this standard simulates the economically efficient processes of
the perfectly competitive market. This rests in turn on the
assumption that the fair market value as we have defined it
adequately represents the actual tradable value of the property
in question. This assumption is valid only if buyers and sellers
realistically account for all factors affecting the property's value.
The likelihood of confiscation under the police power is one
such factor and only to the extent that it is reflected in the
market price of the property may the market itself be said to
have fully and accurately valued the property for compensation
purposes. If it is not known or understood by buyers or sellers or
both, it will not be reflected in the market price, and the market
may not be said to fully and accurately value the property for
compensation purposes. 30 Although courts are not empowered
to substitute their own subjective evaluation of property for the
price fairly determined in the market,3 1 they may base their
estimate of market value on information freely available to
buyers and sellers, including the likelihood of confiscation, even
though a particular buyer3 2or seller did not possess this information or grasp its import.
Consider, for example, a case in which an item would, in the
absence of any possibility of confiscation by the state in the
exercise of the police power, have a market value of $100. It is
well known that there exists a seventy-five percent chance that
the property will, in fact, be confiscated. Now suppose the state
takes the property under the power of eminent domain rather
than under the police power. In assessing the compensation due
the owner of the property, even if the owner demonstrates that
there exists a buyer who, either through ignorance of prevailing
market conditions or refusal to act upon knowledge thereof,
would pay $100 for the property, the compensable value of the
property would be found to be only $2533; the imputation of
perfect information and rationality is a logical antecedent to the
simulated efficiency which the compensation payment was meant
to effect. Thus, what we may call the "true market value" (TMV)
of a piece of property may be lower than its "fair market value"
(FMV), and this difference can be attributed to the likelihood
3,1See 0. Williamson, Elements of a Theory of Internal Organization 2-3 (Fels Institute
Discussion Paper No. 26, University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 1972); Radner. Competitive
Equilibrium under Uncertainty, 36 ECONOMETRICA 31 (1968).
31 New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915).
32 Indeed, the notions of efficiency which motivate the payment of compensation are
based on a hypothetical market situation which assumes full and perfect information on
the part of traders in the market. See Arrow, supra note 18, at 61-62. State legislatures
have recognized that imputation of market information is essential to just and rational
administration of compensation law. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-603, comment
(Supp. 1973).
33 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284 (1943); NicHoLs, supra
note 8, § 12.322.
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perceived by informed buyers and sellers that the state will
destroy or diminish the value of the property without compensation in the exercise of the police power.3 4 More precisely, let P be
the perceived likelihood that such police power action will not
occur, where P may take on any vialue between 0 and 1. Then the
true market value of the property in the face of the police power
is given by
TMV = P x FMV + (1 -

P) x APV

where APV, the "after police power value," represents the market value to the owner of the interest in the property which
remains after the police power action. This discounted value is
an efficient one in that it represents the price which would be
established by a perfectly competitive market characterized by
perfect information.
The thrust of this argument has been that the existence of
the police power implies that efficient allocation of resources
may require the payment of compensation lower than the observed price a particular buyer would be willing to pay. But the
concept of true market value becomes useful only when the
probabilities of police power destruction of value which determine it are defined for various types of cases. Specifically, if we
hope to use the concept of true market value as a vehicle for
integrating the concerns of distributional equity with those of
allocative efficiency, we must develop a theory of the police
power which enables us to relate these probabilities to societal
notions of fairness and distributive justice, and make explicit the
value judgments and ethical postulates which underly that
theory.
34 Professor Michelman uses a similar argument to address a related but logically
separable issue. Michelman, supra note 16, at 1237-39. He argues that the issue of
compensability itself may turn on the degree of expectation in the individual that government action will reduce or destroy the value of his property. Thus, if the unregulated
value of a property is $100, the regulated value is $0, and the probability of regulation is,
say, .8, then if the regulation occurs, the owner can be said to have "lost his gamble" and
should receive no compensation for the loss he has suffered as a result of the regulation.
In other words, the fact that the expectation of regulation is high may be determinative
of whether the regulation itself is an action in the police power or a compensable taking.
Regardless of the merit of this line of reasoning, it deals with a problem analytically
distinct from that of what compensation is due for a governmental action independently
characterized as a compensable taking. In the above example, prior to the regulatory act
itself, the market value of the property in question was $20; that is, while the "payoff' in
the event the owner "loses his gamble" is $0, the value of the "lottery ticket" represented
by the property prior to the "playing of the game" is $20. Thus, exercise of the eminent
domain power instead of the police power does not signal a playing of the game and a
determination that the owner has lost; rather, it is a taking of the lottery ticket itself, the
compensable value of which is $20. This argument reflects the notion that the owner of
condemned property is theoretically to be restored in full measure for the value of the
property taken, although this value may be reduced by the possibility (unfulfilled if the
property is taken by eminent domain) that the property will be confiscated without
compensation through the police power.
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UTILITARIAN CALCULUS

The formulation of a theory of the police power, in essence,
entails a balancing of individual interests against societal concerns. Therefore, it would be virtually impossible to discuss this
problem without having in mind some conception of social
justice. For the purposes of this Comment, a utilitarian perspective has been chosen, not because that theory is a unique or even
the preferred alternative, 3 5 but because much of current American social and economic policy can be traced back to utilitarian
underpinnings.
A.

The Costs and Benefits of an Exercise of the Police Power vs. the
Power of Eminent Domain

In its most general terms, the utilitarian ethic3 6 provides us
with a conceptually simple algorithm for deciding whether governmental action in a given instance is warranted and, if so,
whether such action is to be a compensable taking under the
power of eminent domain or a noncompensable assertion of the
police power. Governmental policy in this area, as in others, is to
be formulated so as to maximize the aggregate social welfare.
Action under the police power will be taken only if the social
benefits of such action exceed the accompanying social costs;
similarly, compensable condemnation of property is justified
only if the social benefits of such a taking are greater than its
social costs. Should the net benefits (that is, social benefits less
social costs) of both police power and eminent domain actions be
positive in a given situation, then the two powers may be said to
exist concurrently, and the government must choose between the
two. The decisional rule governing such cases is simply that the
form of collective action yielding the greater net benefit is to be
favored.3 7
But merely stating the problem in these terms, of course,
does not solve it. Clearly, before the broadly defined notions of
social costs and benefits can begin to be of use in the creation of
35 Consider, for example, the alternative offered by J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE

1971).

36 It is not our purpose here to explore in depth the bases and progression of
utilitarian thought. Professor Michelman's remarkably perceptive and insightful essay
develops in penetrating detail the relationship between the compensability of individual
harms caused by collective action and utilitarian principles. See Michelman, supra note 16,
at 1166-83, 1208-18.
37 Compare Professor Michelman's formulation of the problem:_Let E be the social
benefit of governmental acquisition of the property; D be the social cost incurred if no
compensation is paid; and S be the social cost incurred if compensation is paid. Then the
State will acquire the property if and only if E exceeds the smaller of D and S; that is, if E
> min (D,S). Should this be the case, acquisition will be by eminent domain if D exceeds
S, and through the police power if S exceeds D. Professor Michelman's accounting of
social costs and benefits is somewhat different from ours, however. See Michelman, supra
note 16, at 1214-15.
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social policy, we must give more precise operational content to
them and provide some indication as to how they might be
calculated. If by these terms we mean to embrace aggregate
increases and decreases in societal satisfaction and welfare rather
than simply monetary measures of profit and loss, we are faced
at the outset with the need to make important and difficult value
judgments. Perhaps the least controversial of these is. the presumption that the sole components of aggregate social welfare
are the levels of personal well-being and satisfaction experienced
by the individual members of society. But even this condition
requires first that these personal welfare measures be roughly
comparable in the sense that they may be added together to yield
aggregate social welfare, -and second that those individuals
charged with the task of calculating social costs and benefits be
able to estimate with some confidence the magnitude of changes
in individual welfare levels experienced by other persons.38
Moreover, we must decide on the weights to be assigned to the
individual welfare levels of various persons or groups in the
calculation of social welfare. While our first impulse might be to
assign equal weights to all individuals, a moment's reflection will
show that such a judgment might be deemed inappropriate.
Should equal weight be attached to welfare benefits felt by the
rich and costs sustained by the poor in the creation of policy
regarding income distribution? And should we weigh equally
'benefits accruing to wrongdoers and costs incurred by their
victims in writing the criminal law?
Let us put these issues aside for the moment to examine
more closely the nature of the personal welfare costs and benefits
which fall on individuals as a result of collective action. It may be
helpful to picture these costs and benefits as being composed of
two fairly distinct elements; a purely "economic" component and
a "moral" or "distributive" component. The economic part refers
to the dollar gain or loss which an individual absorbs in the wake
of a given governmental action, or to other kinds of benefits or
harms which are reasonably capable of translation into monetary
terms. Moral costs and benefits, 39 on the other hand, are meant
to account for the individual's feelings about the fairness or
justice of the effects of collective action and to measure the

'1

In the shorthand of welfare economics, these are problems of interpersonal utility
comparisons.
39It may, of course, be the case that moral costs and benefits, as we have defined
them, depend upon the income or social status of the individual, and this poses serious
problems for the utilitarian in the formulation of many kinds of social policy, particularly
those areas touching significantly upon the distribution of income. Compare Hochman &
Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 542 (1969), with Musgrave,
Comment, 60 AM. EcoN. REv. 991 (1970). However, in using the concept of moral costs
and benefits to help deal with the issues raised by the Porter case, we shall be considering
moral effects which, to a large extent, cut across lines of income and class.
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change in personal welfare he experiences due to his own ethical
or moral feelings about how he or some other citizen has fared
as a result of the action. 40 Although measurement of both these
components is subject to the inherent uncertainty of interpersonal comparisons of changes in welfare levels it provides us with
the means by which we can explicitly incorporate the concerns of
distributional equity as well as those of allocative efficiency into
the utilitarian calculus.4 1
Consider four possible ways in which an individual can be
enriched. At the one extreme are-situations where the individual
comes by his wealth through his own efforts and talents in
completely legal endeavors. These might include both cases in
which the individual has produced the wealth himself and those
in which he has purchased wealth legally produced by another.
At the opposite pole are those situations in which an individual
realizes an increase in wealth solely through his own illegal or
proscribed activities. Lying between these extremes are what
might be called "windfalls," cases in which an individual is
enriched through no effort, act or quality of his own. We can
identify in this area both "legal windfalls," increases in wealth
generated by the legal and proper activities of others and passed
on to the individual in question, by gift, inheritance or mere
chance, and "illegal windfalls," where the wealth was generated
by the proscribed activities of another and passed on to the
individual.
Development of social policy towards these four modes of
property acquisition requires that we examine the social costs
and benefits involved in permitting the retention of property (or
its equivalent in cash) acquired in each of these ways against a
potential claim by the state that a greater net social benefit would
accompany confiscation of the property. That is, we must ask in
40

Thus, the concept of moral costs and benefits, which are a species of what
economists refer to as consumption externalities, includes some of Professor Michehman's
"demoralization costs" and some of what he terms "efficiency gains [and losses]." See
Michelman, supra note 16, at 1214. While it is possible to stretch Professor Michelman's
categories to embrace these effects, the present formulation will prove more convenient
for purposes of our analysis.
41In more mathematical terms, the problem posed at the outset of this section now
looks like this:
Let Awl be the change in personal welfare experienced by the itn
individual; n be the
number of individuals in society; Be and Ce be the benefits and costs, respectively, of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain; B, and C, be the benefits and costs,
respectively, of exercise of the police power; and let NSBP, be the net social benefit of a
given exercise of the police power or the power of eminent domain.
Then
n

NSB.J, = B.. - t-,p = 1.(Aw

1)

e,p

where a, represents the weight attached to the welfare of the it" individual in the social
welfare calculation. Action in the police power is appropriate if NSBP > 0, and condemnation is proper if NSBe > 0. If both are positive, police power action is favored if NSB ,
> NSB,, and condemnation if NSB, > NSB.
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each case whether the aggregate social welfare is maximized by
destruction or diminution of the value of the property to the
holder in the exercise of the police power or by allowing the
holder to retain the value either in the form of the property
itself or in the form of compensation for condemnation by the
State.
First consider the case of illegal generation; permitting retention of such wealth or its cash equivalent leads to economic
benefits for the holder himself and for those who might trade
with him for the property, but imposes economic costs on the
remainder of society in the form of decreased material or personal security, diminished incentives to produce wealth through
legal means, and increased incentives to commit illegal acts.
Further, moral costs are imposed upon those who view such
retention as unfair or unjust, and unless there exists considerable
sympathy for the criminal in his enrichment among the members
of society, the aggregate of these moral costs will very likely be
quite large. The illegality of the acts which generated the wealth
is prima facie evidence of a societal consensus that if the wealth
were allowed to be kept, a net social cost would result, even if the
welfare increments of criminals were not discounted. 42 Discounting the effect of welfare benefits to the criminal and his knowing
trading partners in the social welfare calculation simply increases
the excess of social costs over social benefits. In view of overriding social costs, sound utilitarian policy would advise confiscation
or destruction of illegally generated wealth in the exercise of.the
police power.
Now consider the case of legal generation. Allowing the
holder of such wealth to keep it or its full cash value implies
economic benefits to the holder himself and to those who would
trade with him, and to the rest of society in the form of increased
material and personal security and increased incentives to produce through legal means. In the absence of external diseconomies, 43 economic costs appear to be negligible. Moreover,
the legality of the acts which led to the wealth can be taken to
imply a societal judgment that such acts are productive of social
welfare and hence to be encouraged. Thus the moral costs of
retention (in the form, perhaps, of dissatisfaction with the legally
sanctioned distribution of wealth) presumably are relatively
small. In this case, then, there. is a strong utilitarian presumption
that holders of legally generated wealth ought to be permitted to
retain it.
a
The windfall cases are somewhat more problematic. In the
See text following note 38 supra.
That is, uncompensated economic costs imposed on others by the use of property
by the holder.
42
4
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case of legal windfalls, economic benefits comparable to those in
the legal generation situation accrue to the holder of the wealth
and his lawful trading partners, but because the holder himself
has contributed nothing productive in exchange for his benefits,
and thus has not "earned" them in the sense that a holder of
legally generated wealth has, it is reasonable to assume that the
economic benefits realized by the rest of society in the form of
heightened production incentives are somewhat smaller in this
case than in the legal generation case. 4 4 Furthermore, the absence of productive effort on the part of the holder might well
generate substantial moral costs, for it may well be that many
individuals who have no objection to the accumulation of wealth
by those whom they perceive to have earned it do indeed see some
distributive injustice in the enjoyment of wealth obtained
through a fortuitous accident of birth or position. Thus, while
there may be a net social benefit to allowing holders of legal
windfalls to keep the value of such property, that benefit is likely
to be significantly smaller than that produced by a similar policy
toward holders of legally generated wealth, and in particular
classes of legal windfalls, the balance of social costs and benefits
associated with a policy of property retention might be very
close.
Similar considerations are present in the case of illegal
windfalls. Certainly the illegal act which generated the wealth
imposes substantial economic costs both on the victim of the
illegal act and upon the remainder of the community, but these
latter costs, those of decreased security and increased incentives
in the direction of criminal activity, are mitigated to some extent
by the innocence or lack of complicity in the crime of the actual
holder of the wealth. Moral costs of retention as well are likely to
be smaller in this case than in the case of illegal generation, for
many will perceive less injustice in allowing the blameless windfall beneficiary to retain such wealth than in following a similar
policy toward the wrongdoer himself. Again, though there may
still be a net social benefit in a policy of police power confiscation
of illegal windfalls, that benefit can be expected to be smaller
than that produced by a confiscatory policy aimed at the actual
perpetrators of criminal activity and, as in the case of legal
windfalls, there may be situations in which the balance of costs
and benefits of such a policy might be quite close.
Application of these abstract principles to the facts of Porter
is straightforward. The enhanced value of the items owned by
Mrs. Porter and sought by the government clearly represent
what we have termed an illegal windfall. The enormity of the
44 It is true, of course, that plans to bestow a windfall upon another may have some
incentive effects upon the potential donor.
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crime which produced the wealth, the assassination of the President of the United States, and the public reaction to it suggest
both the magnitude of the social costs imposed by the assassin
and the absence of mitigating sympathy for his act. Moreover, it
seems safe to say that Mrs. Porter herself is at best perceived as
an ethically neutral figure; while most of us do not see her as
carrying any responsibility whatsoever for the crime, neither ao
we view her as more deserving of legal or moral consideration
than another similarly situated but more anonymous holder of
an illegal windfall. Given these circumstances and our theoretical
framework, it is not unreasonable to suggest that thq social
benefits of a policy of police power acquisition of these items by
the government without compensation might well exceed its
social costs. The significance of this conclusion for our purposes
is simply that the Congress, in the realization of arguably reasonable and representative social values within a utilitarian
framework, might plausibly have chosen to acquire the items
taken from Mrs. Porter by assertion of the police power rather
than adopting the contrary policy of permitting Mrs. Porter to
retain the enhanced value of the property in the form of com45
pensation for it.
B. Likelihood That the Police Power Will Be Exercised Rather Than
the Power of Eminent Domain
In Section I it was argued that the compensation due the
owner of condemned property may be smaller than the fair
market value of the property if that figure does not properly
account for the probability that the government, rather than
choosing to condemn the property, might have elected instead to
deprive the owner of its value by a valid assertion of the police
power, and the last section demonstrated that, even though
Public Law 89-318 provided for condemnation with compensation, a utilitarian Congress might reasonably and legitimately
46
have seized the items or deprived Mrs. Porter of their value
without compensation through the police power. Thus, there
remains the task of delineating precisely the relationship be4

5 It is apparent, of course, both from the language of Public Law 89-318 and its
legislative history, see 111 CONG. REc. 23,003 (1965) (remarks of Representatives Gross
and Rogers), that Congress believed that condemnation of the property by eminent
domain was the proper course. It is interesting to note in this connection that, in the
course of congressional debate, the issue of appropriate compensation for property
taken by eminent domain under these circumstances was briefly raised, and some doubt
was expressed that payment of the fair market value of such items (specifically, the
weapon used in the assassination, see note 27 supra) would constitute "just compensation."
See 11 CONG. REc. 23,003-04 (1965) (remarks of Representatives Gross, Rogers, and
Whitener).
4" Congress could have deprived Mrs. Porter of their value by forbidding, for
example, their transport across state lines for commercial purposes. See Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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tween the existence of this plausible police power theory and the
calculation of retention probabilities, and thereby the true market value of the property. Specifically, it must be shown, within
useful limits, what likelihood existed at the time of the enactment
of Public Law 89-318 47 that Congress, under a theory like that
already advanced, 48 would provide for the noncompensable destruction of the value of the property to Mrs. Porter, rather than
providing as it did, for condemnation of it.
For these purposes, assume first that, in the creation of
broad social policy of the kind of concern to us here, Congress
makes its decisions by a rough, and perhaps implicit, comparison
of the social costs and benefits of the various alternatives open to
it; that is, that Congress acts generally as a utilitarian policymaking body. Second, assume the set of value judgments and ethical
postulates which formed the basis of the cost-benefit analysis of
Subsection A is shared to some extent by the Congress. This
assumption will hold if one accepts the suggestion that those
values are to a substantial degree representative of commonly
shared American social mores, and that Congress reflects the
feelings of the American public.
With these assumptions in mind suppose that a bill is pending before Congress which would reduce or destroy the value of
some property interest held by an individual without providing
for compensation to the owner. In the course of its deliberations,
Congress presumably will estimate the social costs and benefits
attending the exercise of the police power in this way, and
should it find that the social benefits of the measure exceed its
social costs, the bill will be passed. On the other hand, were
Congress to determine that the social costs of the legislation are
greater than its benefits, it would either refrain from acting
against the property interest at all or substitute a bill calling for
condemnation of the interest with compensation under the
power of eminent domain. At the same time, the public at large,
and particularly those persons who are potential traders in the
property interest in question, is presumed to be making similar
calculations along the lines of the model of Subsection A. Based
on these public appraisals of the costs and benefits of congressional assertion of the police power, we can readily identify four
possible situations:
Case 1: The trading public perceives the benefits of police
power action by the Congress to be very much smaller than its
social costs. In this case, even if Congress were to view the

'

4

We assume, for simplicity, that no information concerning the delibirations of
Public Law 89-318 by Congress was available to buyers and sellers of affected goods'prior
to its enactment. As will become clear, our model can easily be adapted to account for the
relaxation of this assumption.
18 See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
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relative magnitudes of these social costs and benefits slightly
differently, and count social costs of such action to be somewhat
lower than those perceived by the public while perhaps estimating the social benefits to be slightly greater, the relative
excess of social costs of the proposed police power action over its
benefits would still, in all likelihood, be observed by the Congress. Thus, the correspondence between the value judgments
which formed the basis of the public's appraisal and those which
existed in Congress need not be exact; Congress might either
estimate social costs and social benefits somewhat differently
than the public at large, or place slightly modified weights on the
individual welfare levels of particular persons or groups in the
social welfare calculation without affecting the result that social
benefits of the police power action are less than the social costs.
This being the case, the a priori judgment of the trading public
would be that the likelihood of such congressional action was
very small; that is, the retention probability in the face of the
police power would be very close to one.
Clearly, property interests acquired in the mode which we
have termed "legal generation" fall into this category. If such
interests were to be taken by the government under the eminent
domain power, and if it were determined in condemnation
proceedings that the fair market value, as courts have used that
term, did not sufficiently account for the possibility of police
power action adverse to the owner of the property, 49 our theory
would imply that just compensation in the form of true market
value would essentially be identical to the fair market value.
Case 2: Quite similar considerations govern situations in
which the trading public is presumed to appraise the social
benefits of police power action as vastly greater than its social
costs. Arguments analogous to Case 1 lead to the conclusion that
the a priori likelihood of congressional police power legislation is
very high and therefore that the retention probability is quite
close to zero.
This description seems naturally to apply to property interests falling within the "illegally generated" category, and the
theory indicates that if the market price of such property did not
reflect adequately the potential for governmental destruction of
the value of the property without compensation, the owner of
such an interest would be entitled to very little in the way
of compensation should the interest be condemned. This would
be true even if the fair market value of the interest were
substantial, because the true market value (that is, the fair
market value discounted here by a retention probability close to
zero) would be very small.
49

See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
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Case 3: Consider first the situation in which the relative
magnitudes of the social costs and benefits of police power action
by the Congress are much closer to one another than in the two
previous cases, but in which the trading public, on the strength
of a cost-benefit analysis like that of Subsection A, is presumed to
perceive the social costs of such action as greater than its
benefits. While the public's a priori judgment would thus be that
such police power legislation is unlikely, the question is more
difficult than in Case 1. This is because a small deviation by
Congress from the value judgments underlying the public's
cost-benefit calculation could tip the balance between perceived
costs and benefits and lead Congress to pass the police power
legislation in the belief that the social benefits of the action
outweighed its social costs; this deviation could easily grow either
from a small "error" on the part of Congress in assessing social
costs or from a slight difference between the ethical judgments
presumed by the legislators and the trading public. The relatively small difference between publicly perceived social costs
and benefits arising out of the potential exercise of the police
power points to an inherent uncertainty not present in our
earlier cases. Thus, while the retention probability is high (that
is, greater than one-half) due to the public's presumed judgment
that the social costs of police power action outweigh the social
benefits of such legislation, there exists a significant possibility
that Congress will see the matter differently, and so the retention
probability is substantially less than one.
Situations such as this might well arise when the property
interest involved is what we have portrayed as a "legal windfall."
Recall that in such cases, the social costs of police power action
were arguably lower than in legal generation cases, and the
attendant social benefits were arguably greater. The relevant
probability of retention would therefore be lower, although
exactly how much lower would depend on the circumstances of a
given case. An owner of property interests classified as legal
windfalls might thus expect substantial compensation for them in
condemnation proceedings, but this reimbursement will in general be smaller than it would have been had the interests been
legally generated.
Case 4: We come, finally, to instances in which the difference between the perceived social costs and benefits associated
with police power legislation by the Congress is once again
relatively small, but in which the trading public is held to regard
the social benefits of such action as greater than the corresponding social costs; a case in this group could well concern
wealth generated by an "illegal windfall." Arguing analogously to
Case 3, we can conclude that because there exists a significant
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likelihood that Congress will estimate the costs and benefits
involved so as to contradict the judgment of the trading public,
the probability of retention in the face of the police power,
although less than one-half, is substantially greater than zero. As
before, the facts of each case will determine the precise value of
the retention probability relevant to the case, but owners of
illegal windfall interests will generally find that compensation in
the wake of condemnation of those interests, while not negligible, will be much smaller than the fair market value (presuming
that value not to have previously accounted for the possibility of
police power action) of the property.
A rather clear set of relationships appears between the
various classes of property interests we have identified and the
probabilities that such interests will not be taken or destroyed
without compensation by the government in the assertion of the
police power. It may be summarized as follows:
Mode of Property
Acquisition
1. Illegal generation by
holder
2. Illegal windfall to holder
3. Legal windfall to holder
4. Legal generation by
holder

Retention Probability
Very close to zero;
Greater than zero, but less
than Y2;
Greater than , but less than
one;
Very close to one.

Under this analysis, fixing compensation for Mrs. Porter's
condemned illegal windfalls in a way which satisfactorily melds
considerations of economic efficiency with concerns of distributional equity becomes a much more tractable problem. If it can
be shown that the fair market value of the items already includes
a devaluation due to the market's perception of the likelihood of
a destructive exercise of the police power, then that value represents the true market value and as such,* is the appropriate
measure of compensation. If, on the other hand, the fair market
value does not account for the possibility of police power action,
then it must be dicounted by a retention probability derived
along the lines already suggested. If, in fact, the fair market
value has not been so discounted and if it is assumed that the
"after police power value" of the Porter property is negligible,
then the district court's award of $3,000 to Mrs. Porter corresponds to an imputed retention probability of approximately. 17,
a result which, while perhaps somewhat harsh, is certainly well
within the range of values anticipated by the theory discussed
here. Thus, our analysis provides a rationale for the result
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reached by the district court and permits the avoidance of the
seemingly logical but ethically disturbing decision of the court of
appeals.
I1.

CONCLUSION

It is not suggested that either court was or should have been
aware of the theory elaborated here. But perhaps the better test
of a legal principle is not whether it can rationalize a past result
but whether it can be used in deciding future cases. Practical
application of the model suggested here is not without its problems. The calculation of precise retention probabilities may in
some cases be impossible or prohibitively costly simply because
the courts have only a limited capacity to obtain and interpret
information essential to such calculations.50 The courts' limited
ability to gain and assess information means that in many
cases-primarily those dealing with windfalls-the analysis suggested here will result not in a single value but in a range of
values within which compensation must be paid.
This is not an especially disturbing result; once the proper
range is found, the judicial process is particularly well suited to
"fine-tuning" decisions according to the circumstances of each
particular case. The gauging of shifting social values is probably
the area of the jury's greatest competence. With the guidance of
a judge who by training and experience is expert in making the
subtle distinctions that distinguish close cases, a jury should find
51
the task of fixing compensation challenging but not impossible.
Thus, in the final analysis, the contribution of this model
may not be in the ultimate fixing of compensation, but in a
narrowing of the range of the courts' discretion. Such a narrowing will certainly have social benefits, for if traders in the market
are able to rely upon principled, consistent judicial valuation of
property, fear of unreasonable deprivations will diminish and
willingness to initiate potentially beneficial transactions will increase.
51This condition is referred to as "bounded rationality." See Williamson, supra note
30, at 2.
51 Thus, the facts of the King case, discussed note 27 supra, might generate a
retention probability different from that in Porter.

